number of areas we do supporta continuing engagement between the united states and china, which we believe is in our bt interests. >> i can't think of a better way to launch the china strategy ku. we are incredibly fortunate to spend time with us today.0 that he spent so much of his life and the strategic mind and its capacity to get things done to strengthen america's role in the world. plse join innking -- [applause] >> ten which is also come can also ask if i can, since i would like to see wlendhanks to mike n purpose in the indo-pacific, it is actually programs like this that play anutsized role. i'm thrilled, if you look at the program, if you look at the team

they are assembling, this truly exciting. so frankly it is my honor to b here. their work will far outlive anything. let's say tha ye. [applause] rush. >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]■& >> are right. good morning, everybody. thanks so much for sticking with us. we have -- that's good news. i actually have more than 800 online 300 in a room, so it's great that with so much a critical part of our mission is to -- crosscheck freeze come into shia political parties to add to the question of moment and that is what we aim to do with his great panel. we'll consider different

perspective on u.s.-china strategy, where there's disagreement or perhaps even mportantly what is agreement and overlap. we are thrilled to beoi paneliso happen to be cfr members pick on the screen behind me3 we have met, former deput natioyvnal goodbyes and often most recently of the boiling both urgent stept book i have commit all of you. that is a fellow at the hoover institutiom at the foundation for the defense of÷í d to my left with bridge colby conformer deputy assistant secretary of the author of the third impact the book strategy did not come american defense in an age of great power conflict and he is currently a principal at a fund■é left with, senior fellow and director of the china our project at csis. xi served three years in the office of secretary of defense

as director for taiwan, counter drugs which are an senior felloe carnegie doublet was unable to join us to do to illness that he will be missed and he will be asked to make it up at a future event. [laughing] so i find this claimant, all thes■s]:e folks here on the star speaking in a personal capacity, and with that we were just a with what help will be a very lightly moderated discussion at the open up its last 20 minutes or audience q&a. just to set the stage we're going to divide the moderator portion into themes. the firsthe end goals of the china strategy. the second is taiwan scenarios. third is privatization trade-offs and starchy and finally will turn to the so with that will begin with the question of in states. al have been about you what is the end goal of u.s.

competition with china? should victory be defined in terms of the relationship with what w some suggest,, should be the kind of government china has as others suggest, , f american interests at keeping the rion free f return to matt pottinger first. matt, you and coggin gallagher question of what it means to win competition and what the end-state should be. so what do you think the end goal of u.s.-china policy shodn? >> great. rush, courtesy. bridge, great as you. and body, how are you guys? look, i think that weee to define, foro, pursue victory as opposed to merely managing the cpe a competition sounds a lot like the '70s policies

that have turned out to their pursuit against the soviet union. and we sho be looking to winot mean war and it does mean capitulation. it's still something in between, but it's very much aimed at ensuring that nation becomes persuaded, that it cannot win either a hotar or our friends, cold war which it is already waging against us and our friends. and i>d■$■! think that if beijiy cannot in achieving their global ends, not just domestic butrñ regional but global aims, that that, in fact, may end up leaving to a different form of government in china. but that's that would

and i were calling for, regime change, but we think important to look at how the soviet cold war played and learned some of the lessons from it.■ because the similarity between the chinese system and the soviet system are underestimated in ouriew. we think that,e look at what george kennan wrote at the beginning of the cold war, y in the cold war, truman administration and to draw a line all war, really with a strategy of the reagannistratiog a stalemate. those strategies did not call for a stalemate. they call for undermi the sources of soviet aggression we should be doing the same with respect to china. >> thanks, matt. to the■2hat the night a chance to exchange views

our wonderful editor dan who i think is listening maybe i'll turn out to bridge. i think he that on the question of end-state. i think you set the t your three of victory something like maybe they thought but from a potii guess my question for you would be with a that in your articulation it would not be stable. what does the content of that meet you? what is owed like a bride, russr including the and congratulations on your service off your. my good friend come all good friends matt and referring to mike, his peace with that. i have summative if you and but i do believe theoretical the a limiting at least on the right set of theommitted peoples attention "city journal" magazine blé that different

tribes on the china issue on the republican side. kind if i would say neil reagans maybe more of a realist that if sim policy with more realistic than people often appreciative that might be the release ie and that's peace, speak for himself.■h my view is the conservative realist. what i would say to you is victory is never final in the sense what was a victory with the soviet union? it was great we want at a think reagan did a great job and others played an important part along way but, of course, that with vladimir putin which is worse than what we face under mikhail gorbachev and elyse is an argument even before that. and that basically stems from the fact that mywest are generay driven u by ideological element andou talk about that rush but if you look to what xi jinping and the chinese government are publicly saying it's the great

rejuvenation china nation strong that's nothing to do with marxism. if anything is the antithesis of classical marxism and so forth they affect in some ways i fear china might be bearing out linens the rate of imperialism. can go into means is what we hae to be realistic about what we expect detente is not satisfied, is not a final solution to that's really together think it's far too dangerous to pursuit because as is that the chinese have heard some of the arguments about victory andky mn foreign affairs and dan who i agree i fanpublished the peace b kaplan■qack in 2020 making the argument agast this type of policy. it is too dangerous. it's not critical for american inre which american interests in my view if you go back to george kennan, georgeaye need to prevent aotlling what are the key and ashanti

regions of the world. whether that iso)mqg, i loath communism. i hope the chinese people become free in that respect it was the government up with nine dash like i don't think which all our problem we have more modest aims way o screw someone like my friend niels ferguson, a fantastic thinker, very clearheaded thinke as i think we need to, this is what i agree with matte, we need to approach a detente, pursue detente from a position e particular visible i would differ frompresentation earliere may want to get into. discussion sometimes people say it's theoretical, et cetera, et cetera. no, tells you the policy you should pursue come, to us to take on, h with other countries, et cetera. >> okay. matt i'm going to come back to you to wayant to turn first to bonny point also heard about this and thoughts on the question of

end-state. >> rush, thank you very much. the light of to be at also being on stage with both matt and bridge who i work with. in terms of thinking through in stage, discovered question we need to think through. we need to think about what can cheap given our capabilities? here i think appreciate mattarit about regime change because try affect domesc of much harder than trying to to help china operates internationally. we will probly are all agree our party should be china's actual behavior. and to the extent we can hope for a change inter china but that shouldn't be our priority. the second point i want to make is when we look at what we want to achieve for in terms of what a joy to call that with china, we need to take into partisan billboard for. botht and bridge may have mentioned this. i don't think our allies and

partners nor do we want a hot war with china. to the extent that constraint our options of how much we can push china on because the more we push, the more in se ways we might losing some of our allies and partners. theas maybe this is where i may disagree more with the bridge and align more with do think that if we were to achieve a world where we want to maintain existing values, we probably can't just have a relationship in which china could think when it looks at its power and ith its own friends and allies that it's about on par with the trend. i think when y d bit more of a picture in whichna please and also our allies and partners understand we have morr china. to the extent we are more unpaired i believe i would create more freomñ? for china vote on its periphery but also international expert■ thanks.

i guess i come back to you matt now with an additional question. you heard perspectives from bridge and bonny. i try t discussion of the moderator i will keep to that practice how■ do you respod to the ideat there's a risk inherently and pursuing something beyond managg could manage competition while at the same time in p managing it take more competitive steps you could otherwise take safely if you didn't try to mention it at all? is their competitive advantage? bonny mention allied but also bilateral component where you actuallyou pick up which are not doing, tried of comes of interaction between states. just counterparty doesn't take the worst possible view of the finger tripe is a value the? you try that for position of leadership. and yopehat in addition to kind of abiding and move on to the next >> sure. , to your point,

rush, i mean, i strong af the pe united states seeking frequently to jinping. xi jinping is the only person who can make consequential decisions in that system, and ts by talking to him directly, not by relying on sycophants and frightened officials fúranko gew as they are to make it difficult point to the boss. i'm a strong believer in aspect of advancing relatiohip with china, no question. i think we have to be a little bit more maybe i would say less naïve about it, the idea that our sending five cabinet office administration did last year, that was some to coax china into a more cooperative

relationship is historically ignorant and so-called fruits of this engagementch. and actually i think sent a signal of weakness to beijing. beijing has become more aggressive, difficult in the time since the biden administration begin its what it called intensive dipma xi jinpie president of the united beijing tripled down on its for russia's war reallyits begin last march, march of 23. by secretary blinken own admission china is becoming overwhelmingly the number one mitrione support of the war. and may haveed parts of the work and russia's favor through that support. beijin is also hosting to beijing while that also been

the , as it wages proxy war around the middle east. and then you can look to venezuela and venezuela is now threatening to invade its neighbor. beijing is significant sympathy to that ank it's 90 for us to think we're going t coax a leninist totality dictatorship to some kind of a cooperative ti but we should be talking to them at the leadership level. just quickly on6a bridg point. we have fun a dispute on the role of ideology i think it's a very important point even though there is a real politic kind of machiavellian imperia s well. the reason why ideology is important because it gives clues into the vulnerabilities of china's strategy. i think we shouldn't ignore

ose signals and critical vulnerabilities. the last point i would make if i don't agree with you, bridg on the idea that putin is worse than the soviet uni i mean, putin's army is like 2 trillion bucks for versus, it's a tiny fraction of u.s. economy. in fact, i think everything all of our allies together with the united states, uned states,tion trillion dollas cumulative economy versuion rus. putin can't do anything. putin is an aftershock sort of symptom of theould not be able o anything he needs to do right now if not f the form of beijing and xi jinping in the material support his providing for putin.'s not a coincidence t

putin signed is no limits packed with xi jinping less than three weeks before he designed come to such a lunches fl-owinvasion. what we're really dealing with his beijing with putin as the junior pitbull. >> i agree with that. well, this conversation can. you can follow it online. [laughing] including twitter and in the pages of foreign affairs. i'll just say one thing brerogas of its purpose. its purpose was not to change chin to change china. was it necessary to solve the problems weav it was, in fact, to create the space for more competitive explaining what we take the competitive steps they have a limit of logic to them. they are not designed to■) fundamentally cause regime change or destroy the chine■@se

communist party's economy. they are basically serious competitive steps that will not apologist for but we will explain. that lov solve problems but to getting informatn on. so the next topic, the next topic will be even more likely. we'll go -- it wille taiwan of course. this is an issue where most agree, the tedious objective is deter a conflict that could cause the globally glo, lubricants and research on this, at least $10 trillion, that's contrary to, more than 10% of global gdp. that will be a number greater than person to gdp even the great depression. kurt campbell was saying this could cause a a can of great depression level eve.■, that's what he was referring to. want to talk to bonny fresco start with you bonny. you've written a lot about this, thought a lot about this, your team has run tabletop exercise. how uent conflict,

how optimistic or pessimistic are you about u.s. aspects if one breaks out based on your own exercises? co related to this, , your team concluded a thoughtful analysis, i was excellent, quenching scenarios which you distinguish some blockage sinners because avalon but it's a debate, how likely are cortinanarios, bridge and i talked about this rs think about all that. with that extremely needy s bodk us off. >> thanks for finding a rec report which of course we want more folks to read. in terms of looking at the risk of crisis in the taiwan strait i was in the nt going to be higher than our past ten years for at least ts a goos capability. there's about capability can to increase. that isn't just in terms of the people's liberation arm enforcement is coast guard. as we look know, i'm

not saying china would use force in 2027 but we do not xi jinping has set that as a goal for china to the capability to be able to engage in a large-scale that capability is one factor china will take into account. r is china's intent and china's a set that of the situationit note china -- ct president most negative places both. we seem foreign minister label was in life as a traitor. the ps has seen, actual last week, righ initial guidelines on how china willpun. folks in particular china intends more punishment on the leaders of taiwan independence. china didn'tuitel name william but i think those of us are following thi a this

as being labeled a target. use measures china did not■ take under the pirate past■0 ar bothe will and the intent committed andre chinese as glcm more chinese coercion may expect in the near-term versus■4 long-term, i am of the view that equating could happen anytime. because right now to be honest wouldn't have great response and just cited china which engage in 14 -- what you taiwan. it would not be necessary that cossey for china. but a quarantinero a blockade comps i would kitchen blockade invasion of those are probably options keep at a later time closer to 1.7 or later than the immediate future. >> thanks party.■ce nonincome ay people work on this issue so i hoping to some of you will jump in.

me turn to you, matt. you just book, out for me next week pick some miracle others are here i see ivan, retired many years ago asd to the kind of questio the likely high in sinners, how do e issue should the united states due to deter those situations or sinners but also give the scenarios and what do we do after? may thatve>> yeah, sure. bonny, congrats on your report.i will read it this week. because my co-authors and i come ■aiv were just -- [inaudible] inogether with his new cabinet. course of writing the boiling about messing scenarios and

gray zone scenarios and decide things along the spectrum including the quarantine. i think some of these exercises were seeing right now like the one right after president lines inauguration last month, i call them sor of fsh blockades, -- president lai -- exercise beijing can reverse, they can de they can threaten the flow o may energy supplies in the taiwan. i ultimately we should be tabletop exercising for quarantine scenarios together with japan and taiwan, southrope. because quarantines are very, very difficultwithout ultimateld to move up the those scenarios■y

just mention would become more cossey that'll aforetime want for china itself. soe figuring out, look at some of the quarantines inhe p the united states impose a quarantine in the early '60shñ around cuba to prevent missiles andinto cuba. that quarantine ultimately worked but it was extremely difficult to enforce and the soviets had some the continued running the quarantine it orce the united states to have to move up the escalation -- the escalationatti of the atlantic. but i'm really looking forward to that, bonny face, matt. that takes me to bridge. we just had this quenching blockade invasion discussion. ul would most. i think it's invasion. how do you think also about the

possibility of cortina blockade scenarios bee should prepare for how would you suggest respond to the? the second related question if 2 could, you have an public about the urgency of the taiwan many people in his room probably i think you said we can'ty maintain as americans our quality of life this time when the taiwan falls to give include views should be careful about the kinds ofhat use on taiwan cannot make political statement because of tra strategic interest. one question going to on the discussion went withonny and that is when we say we need taiwan to be the way it ismericn quality-of-life erode, d.c. that d.c. that is call for permanent separationovocative politicallya as well? -- i think it's very important to compare what i'm saying to■hat depcretary cak in a lot of ways his speech kinf

arguments i've been making and i think there are a couple in his speech. most of which will come to your question in a moment. >> but i think it's come one oft to most of which was commendable deserves to be lauded as a portable when he said he doesn't near-term attack on taiwan something we really need to worry about. i don't think that's a rational judgment. tion than ietary campbell has do what fundamentally based on my experience analytically i don't think there is intelligence that could give truly reliable confidence that we do not need to worry about it. we're going to see is going to happen in plain sight i build on what bonny said, yeah the intense as well as i think sort of broader ambitionso break chain. and is china actually moving to resolve the taiwan issue in his favor?

i think it's take a series of costly signals to doxactly that. one is conventional to build up to build the taiwan issue but ag will assume taiwan overtime.ey s were developing space give mr. budgett military power much farther away. that is cossey signal china thinkst is reliably and first island chain. the nuclear buildup which i expa big part of it has to be the potential for large conflict with the united states. the economic resurgence china is aware of bloomberg analysis and the threats of people and deputy secretary campbell. however credible at a question or credible really are, at the c sections. yet china and emits economic headwinds is make the economy -s to wt the chinese are accessing, not just to --

>> all that together, then i say, well, i mean, tony blake is nobody idea forkessin chinese have given of the instruction for 2027 and moved the calendarbill burns has alsot ensued by. with all the signals and it and please call me out if i have come i never sns i'm saying we don't know and by doing the reporting in the "wall street journal" late last year that intelligence sources on china arenl very limited and, frankly, i think if you look at the history of the soviet union and so forth it's very rare to get truly reliable information especially fro close leninist cisa xi jinping i doubt trust own family. we have to so we don't know. this is why my twin tweet is whoever is elected president in could happen. so t gets to the other point, which is what do we need to be

worried about? quarantines are t decisive. i'm listening to matt butre als. there's also the possibility for the war to escalate to the 4 level. that was the big stick in the closet in my view i could see quarantine situations and that deserves a serious analysis. i think china could only rational, matt knows president lai better than ie's a way the d voluntarily give it up because they blo an and imports and a taiwan or whatever it is. they are not going to do that and that's very clear. if china is going to solve is going to go to invasion. the problem with the blockade symmetry what both eli and randy shrir are both fantastic thinkers and visit to be ened to, not infallible, but they said a blockade is not the most rationat different view but a think if i'm thinking

myself if i were sitting i problem i would say if you'r goe agent look at the phillies of putin because matt is right putin is much less capable than china, you make sure you get it right. if you're going to do that to generate as much surprise as possible. that has kd of coherent i could lead you into a cul-de-sac analytically but what that means is we should be prepared militarily and will get to the issue of trade-offs and that's what fundamentally disagree secretary campbell.e have to be virtually concern and we are now in where invasion could happen almost at anytime. i'm not saying i think it's govg to happen tomorrow. i think it more likely out later in the decade as t factor couple factors. what is the military balance i called tom shugart went a friend of my combat does ais a navy cae military balance in thehines point of view.

other people know this may very that's one thing. if you're going to do that's what hitler in 1939 eco-multiple examples in history and, of course, xi jinping own guess 711 consulting like that. he's not a spring chicken. you don'tt to be 80 come right? i'm not saying that is to come at it butto act as if were thery will get to the third session b. >> i'm and asked our panelist to be as well. it's a great answer. [laughing] it's a great answer but speedy you ask a lot of questions. >> i had a few. that's oy. [laughing] i think we will transition to the question of trade-offs but before we get there. made aboute urgency, i think that's widely straight including hisferences f what we will see when. that's maybe i find bonnie's analysis interesting

and useful because i think iny l assessment not using any kind of other a set of mechanisms but is no personal assessment the scanner scenarios are really concern and any immediate term likely. perhaps under theorized. let's move on now to the kind of an ultra back to you bridge to striff of speedy be briefing. >> you set up see you can now answer directly on target. strategies about course aligning. i would like to spend time on this is an area substantial discriminate. as we discussed the use faces very serious conflict in the taiwans deputy secretary mitch and south china. ongoing war in europe and the new peace. and it's time we are witnessing alignment china, dprk at her in turkey made the case u.s. might need to pull back in some places, for sure in more places, ukraine possibly the middle ea.& search attention taiwan and indo-pacific because werore.

you saihould completely abandoned ukraine. i get a chance respond to tha i guess my question to you is if it isn't your position with specific to want t its allies ad partners do in ukraine and in and of these so you c focus more on the indo-pacific? >> i will start when you ended. it's a caricature but the crux is basically to which is we cannot allow our focus and it is paradoxical to see seek ther of the pivot thatasically in my point of view action arguing for thes everything is interconnected i would say no, a couple think. if the trend is urgent)# and imminent what can realistically stop it? it would be simplistic but true agree with micah gallagher very much. it's going to be hard power i it a great economic sanctions. they are com against china and that's another area where i would be interested to hear the deputy site is a because administration has been saying this policy but that is

basically sayianghina h propped up russian. economic sanctions are stopping russia or china from doing the critical things that i do not believe given the result of the chinese leadership capacity chinese economy and military and authoritarian political structure will be abli to post economic let alone soft power cost on china that would defeat a determined attack on taiwan. we can argue whether it may be better as a deterrent. i'm prepared to concede a little bit but basically it's going pot place a right time. one i disagree on w campbell said is all the money and weapons capability we a set to ukraine and europe would not help in the ridiculous i'm sorry that you see the president is basically shifted towards advertising. he said taiwan will not be affected. the indo-pacific is a a much bigger issue. you have to philippine, japan defended as■@■ if it's true we need to be ready at any time we should be movingr

anyone who follows the biden not have a multi-were mr. kirk the rand corporation assessed the trajectory lose over toonder multiple navy programs are delayed. the pheasant is based is.ecialle like, find it shockingand if the interconnected, if the theaters interconnected this prioritize e we have■ume they will act collaboratively precisely. what does this mean? i' give clear warning about wt wemm can do. i don't have a theological opposition to supporting ukraine. >> endless resource. >> should we cut ukraine eight. >> was basic as about my time magazine article ash i would allocate money for something like the supplemt put 61 billioe indo-pacific. as mike gallagher said, 2,000,000,004 taiwan or something like 10 billion or whatever for ukraine

capabilities as my friend austin and i've written about. if they manifolds are not relevant for first island chaini support f-16s come these head of things. the key thing,othing■ee the administration and a lot of republicans have airedndns any e is where do -- theop step up ano virtually. that's all he could happen if you're clear with them and one of t things i've been trying to say. >> yes or no than on for the dollars to ukraine?■l >> smaller. >> so the april 60 60 done sd not have? >> no. you could have 60 billion for first island chain and kindling for ukraine. n' prioritizing?>> the problem s went to do something that they usáo■e speed and use of our. >> was on the sink i was supported. hold on. there are real fiscal issues in this country. have speedy we'll come

back to the. got you. so i i did that -- should by priors for all come back to the question i want toe weigh in. i think i will wait in myself now. but matt speedy you already have, my friend. >> i i just ask que i know you have strong views on this as well. >> let's assume zoom outt again. remember when i'm saying asphyxiation trillion dollars selected economy, okay? if you take the axis of chaos, wh iran, north korea, plus i would add venezuela and cuba as a couple wannabes in the a chaos, their combined economies are about one-third come so we are ■rthreeimes the economy. if you remove china, we areike

25 times their economies. yet, if you look at what the axis of chaos is spending on its defense, , it is almost equal to at the united states spent last year on envelope looking at envelope. china is probably spent about 70 in actuality on its■ military. all that adds up to about $806 billion. we spent only a little bit more than that last year. why not actually take a deep breath, look at the fact t have radically greater economic power. we have the more innovative businesses, and actually start increasing our defense spending while also addressing very real problems. it's not just the funding levels for its the have allowed

our defense industry to sort of i would say ties over the course of the last 20 years. this is fixable. and s hard power is really what it's going to boil down to get i agree with them at the main the eater is the indo-pacific. i am not opposed to the idea of rebalancing some of the spending, certainly more heavily towards taiwan. micah gallagher a i wrote about a deterrent fund, $20 billion figure, just for dealing with his primary problem of deterring china in the western cific. but i think this is doable. we are spending historically low levels on defense rightow and se budget the size of our active military is smaller at any point since the eve of world war ii. are you kidding me? this is

.. [h■m

and spending on the other critique you could make

was transferring to ukraine and it is not reliv in this perception but those amounts are ■6relatively small for all that which is an important fact. i think to is as sustainable as you argue? 60,000,000,002 ukrai, could both? based on the numbers, the answer seems to be yes but we could at you know what send? the american people

ukraine, i watch the and commercial decrease in capability is small■ompared to resolve so that is a trade-off. an excellent way to think about it, americans have different views. if you want to mobilize let's cut through here here, so going off? concern. >> i think my strategy is , it's basically if this is the biggesd

threat and why are we not focung on that? the cover argums they are, china more sophisticated -- actually i would say moreai. course taiwan fight going to be, they are definitely going to get an invasion. there are huge about and we are reoriented fore efficiency is far overwhelmed by

the fte are focusing on ukraine. set the upper hand these factors so gover at the state of our military he, is atrocious. so he came in and said all right, i get what you're saying but there is still allowed the of the infant defensend device saying the money is not a lot. joiningion why

didn't you do it then?4. great t what we are dealing with. want to get. i'm supportive of ukraine were looking at the reality and how we are doing think this is important, but speak clearly and priorities and then we can write. we can say we do■7v that's not going to work. it happened in five years how that is t end it took years. the back to live the real

overhauled. in some ways is getting worse. that is the world and are trying to. [laughter] >>aropefully there be a chance to turn in. what you end up is the final part of this there is a might be more gre@6 so let me begin with building in the united states. i agreed some most disagreement want to wrap

around this discussion of foreign policy and appropriate policy that has him domestic components in the industrial leadership, that we are divided. give us a for this home and abroad5ée1. >> one quick thing going back, this is related question, president biden has $s

discretion of the big chunk went into pandemic necessary but we can that. loans and amnesty. double defense spending going 3p percentage of gdp during the cold war

it brought cold peaceful ending. i'll give you a cra÷%■l iéw other forms of publicervice know when i served at memories no one wants to goacvietnam ware option serving in the military so youot pushing wars be done more

bringing young americans into m. >> that's a great suggestion. anything you want to drop in? >> no. fundamentals of my approaches, you have to where they are. there's a lot of rhetoric say some as people show, we are heading over one 100% gdp. in the military are cynical about

it so i am in the mode, that would make it easier on this front. larger off publicans ande seen this people are cynical, clear spending money, it part of a broader read industrial baseld allow us to get back toefen trade-off issues. but world we are

in will. >> we are going to go over like say that but the ultimate intention is recovery reduce massive amounts of growth and employment in the way that most achieve. the other sciences in the pandemic recovery, all the together is focused on economic and technology that. not to see and just but the

larger defense base andak conductors we have to be fix fire attack many of the nuts and boltsstion and all the things the first will be the surveys you do it the right back with the u.s.

priorities. after he told question will spo. on the american people now listen. why they care about china policy? >> that's a tough question. i can't say whether they are right or not right decision. on the china.

we probably education not only/y much more distant but the extent to which time army we educate the americn public they are challenged. >> it's an economic component and related chinao pay attention. what is your position why they should. >>7% of -- the way i pose i china is one of the

only state that can dominate th, future that is the prospect country influence m versions. i genuinely would hate to see a work but if the military balance bring it would be more material4 and you can worry about relevant thing to worry about. another i think with the debate on where we draw the line you prepare for what would be world war i macroud don't want that to happen and that is

■e how this is people don't know or care for sure we can wit within reason achieve denial on a relatively low. i'm skeptical. >> would take three audience questions. >> ameran, half ofs see china at the american people get it, they understand because it should not a threat■i resume or biggest

world war ii.■ get it. 81% of americans thought this crosses everyemographic never have foreign so regime they are. >> i hope you are like all this was asking for our unique ranked different goals, 80% disapproval fully this is where they came out.■7 bonnie's suggestion debate, i'd like to take three questions br.

>> we are talking about trade-offs, let the trump tax cut >> thank you for asking that question. [laughter] >> thanks, good morning congratulations and we heard a lot this morning about coitive stripes, and a lot china's competitive. do you think xi jinping, in light of recent optimism about

china's objective or has he gone years? >> in the.ow does putin impact t asia and visit of plus or minus the u.s. china for the fishing there could be an area they have more corporation work as a work for china's are aligning together?uz >> no claim any expertise and don't speak for anybody but myself. publicans are obviously more in

favor and reinforces the need for prioritization and how much expect, i don't think it's very plausible administration of think it's possible that it would initiate and neither party is running on the. i am skeptical, prepared to believe it may be somewhat true. it's against my personality but i7■he downside. there may be some truth in the other you could read the both ways but the top leaders in the pra thing i need you to be ready suggest you are serious about it.

they donav confidence so maybe thatnother but it goes back to thismc approach, the fundamentals we see. i think it is very bad because it will the fact that deleted and it's bigger to substantiate. it will undermine this which i don't find what is it that kim jong un wants? probably nuclear technology■. we have to assume it's not going to be good for one of what i'm g

china's long-term and activities on china's and. i haven't seen any indication of these so still optimistic in the long. is i thk china is in a difficult spot russia is more willing to instay

it was almost completely inside of north korea against the united the case in japan statement different from four years ago so being put in a difficult position but china is siding more and more with narc korea. >> this is a weird srable symmetry we see right now. in 1950 you had europe and soviet russia for war on the korean peninsula in north

korea and south korea as primary the two sides between russia and ukraine.■x this idea of optimism important as historians war found one of e common indicators of people russia breaks out i optimism on the part of an aggssor. i think, i aee w/ñith the way related out, very optimistic in the long term belief that china's dominance is■; inevitabv

anything to cause i'll leave it at that.■nk you for jo, it's been a lively discussion. we have three expert analysts. we will take break.or our great catalyst. [ala